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2Frederick T. Furlong and Michael C. Keeley*
This paperexamines theoretically the effects ofmore stringent capital
regulation on abank's incentive to increase asset riskandon the expected
liability ofthe deposit insurance system. Ouranalysis shows that regula-
tory increases in capital standards will not require greater regulatory
efforts to restrain asset risk because a bank's incentive to increase asset
riskdeclines as its capitalincreases. Thus, as longas regulatory effortsto
contain asset risk, such as bank examinations, are not reduced, more
stringent capital regulation will reduce the expected liability of the
deposit insurance system.
Over the past several years, bank regulators have
placed greater emphasis on the regulation of bank
capital. For example, the three federal bank regula-
tory agencies have raised capital requirements for
banks and bank holding companies and established
more uniform standards among themselves. I Most
recently, the federal bank regulatory agencies have
put forth proposals for risk-based capital require-
ments that would be coordinated with the Bank of
England. 2
These regulatory measures, in part, are reactions
to deteriorating capital positions, particularly
among the larger banking organizations. Forexam-
ple, among the twenty largest bank holding com-
panies, the average ratio of the book value of
common equity to assets was over6percent in 1968
but only about 4 percent in 1980.3 The increase in
the numberofbankfailures and the correspondingly
sharprise in the Federal DepositInsurance Corpora-
tion's (FDIC's) expenses in recent years also have
intensified interest in capital regulation. Total
expenses of the FDIC, which fluctuated between
about $50 million and $200 million per year in the
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1970s, rose to about $2 billion peryear in 1985 and
1986. Such increases in expenses for the deposit
insurance system have focused attention on increas-
ing the stringency ofbank capital regulation to limit
the FDIC's exposure to losses and to blunt the
incentives for "excessive" risk-taking by federally
insured banks.
The move to more stringent capital standards in
banking, however, has met with considerable con-
troversy as well as some skepticism. Some argue
that higher capital requirements will cause banks
simply to invest in more risky assets, and thereby
offset, or even more than offset, the desired effects
of higher capital. This view often is echoed in the
financial press. In a New York Times article about a
Federal Reserve proposal to require banks to hold
capital in connection with agreements involving
interest rate and currency swaps, William
McDonough, vice chairman ofFirst National Bank
of Chicago, is quoted as saying that "... the
proposalcouldlead banks to take on riskierbusiness
to compensate for the lower returns they would
almost assuredly get by having to maintain more
capital."4
The effectiveness of capital regulation also has
come under question in the academic literature. A
study by Koehn and Santomero (1980), which
assumes that banks maximize utility in a mean-
variance framework,5 is representative ofthe litera-
ture on the theoretical relationship between capitalrequirements and bank asset risk.. They conclude
that ". . . a case could be argued that the opposite
result can be expected to that which is desired when
higher capital requirements are imposed."6
In this paper, we evaluate the popular view of
ca,pjtal rygulatipn and the conclusions of earlier
theoretical studies on the effectiveness of capital
regulation. In contrast to the popular view and the
earlier academic work, we find that more stringent
capital standards alone would not give a bank more
ofan incentive to increase the riskiness ofits assets.
In fact, the incentive to increase asset risk falls as a
bank's capital increases. This implies that, as long
as regulatory and supervisory efforts to limit asset
risk in banking, such as bank examinations, are not
relaxed, increasing a bank's capital will lower that
bank's chance of failure and reduce the expected
liability of the deposit insurance system.
We also show in the Appendix that the conclu-
sions reached byearliertheoretical studies using the
mean-variance framework were derived from inter-
nally inconsistent assumptions. In essence, these
studies implicitly (but unintentionally) assume that
bank failure is not possible by assuming that bor-
rowing costs are unrelated to bank risk. Yet, they
seek to analyze the effects ofcapital regulation on
the probability of bank failure. Moreover, these
studies fail to incorporate the effect of the deposit
insurance guarantee on risk-taking. Although the
results of these studies regarding the effects of
capital regulation on the incentive to increase asset
risk are technically correct when bank failure is not
possible, such findings are oflittle policy relevance
since capital regulation and concern over risk-tak-
ing are relevant only when banks can fail.
The Appendix also contains an example to show
that the results ofthese earlier studies do not gener-
anyhold when subsidized deposit insurance andthe
possibility of bankruptcy are taken into account.
Specifically, we show that when the asset return
distribution is binomial, the incentive to increase
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asset riskdoes not increase as the stringency of
capital regulation increases.
The analytic framework used in the body of this
paper is the state-preference mode! rather than the
mean-variance model used in the older literature on
the topic. One reason for this choice is that the state-
preference model, unlike the mean-variance model,
can easily accommodate the possibility of bank-
ruptcy and an analysis of the effects of mispriced
deposit insuranceon abank's choice ofleverage and
asset risk. 7 Moreover, with the state-preference
model, the effects of changes in capital require-
ments on both banks' gains from increasing asset
risk and the expected liability of the deposit insur-
ance system can be evaluated directly.
Another advantage ofthe state-preference frame-
work is that it can be applied to the analysis ofboth
value-maximizing and utility-maximizing banks.
Utility maximization might be appropriate for cer-
tain smaller, closely held'banks where the owners'
risk preferences affect the riskiness of the banks'
portfolios, whereas value maximization is more
suitable for most otherbanks, particularly the large
publicly held banks whose stockholders can hold
diversified portfolios. Value-maximizing banks
would seek to maximize the current market value of
their equity, which is independent ofthe risk prefer-
ences of the owners.8
In the next section, we start with a discussion of
the nature ofbank capital and the issues that higher
capital requirements raise for bank regulators. In
Section II we introduce the state-preference model
and use it to analyze the effects ofcapital regulation
on asset risk and the liability of the federal deposit
insurance system, under the assumption that banks
choose to maximize the value of stockholders'
wealth. Section III contains a similar analysis,
applying the state-preference model to utility-
maximizing banks. The conclusions and policy
implications are presented in the final section.I. Issues in Capital Regulation
A bank's financial capital that is, its equity
is the difference between the value of the institu-
tion's assets and liabilities. Banks use both capital
and liabilities to finance loans and investments.9
The two sources offunding are distinguished in that
variations in earnings on assets are borne first by
capital holders. The larger the proportion of assets
funded by capital, the greaterthe range ofreturns on
assets thatwill be borne solely by equity holders and
the more likely the promised obligation to liability
holders will be met. Thus, if banks were not
insured, both equity and liability holders, including
depositors, would have an interest in the level of a
bank's capital. As with otherfirms, the stockholders
and liability holders (depositors) of unregulated
banks would be expected to "decide" on a satisfac-
tory combination ofcapital financing and promised
return on bank debt.
The regulation of bank capital, then, must be
predicated on the assumption that a market deter-
mination of the level of capital would not be satis-
factory from a public policy perspective. While
capital regulation predates federal deposit insur-
ance, partly because ofthe externalities argued to be
associated with bank failures, the provision of the
federal deposit guarantee commonly is cited as the
main reason that the level ofbank capital must be a
regulatory concern.
The federal deposit insurance system, by guaran-
teeing deposits, in essence takes on the role of a
bankJiability holder and has an interest in bank
capital similar to that ofprivate liability holders in
an uninsured firm. Indeed, some have argued that
the deposit insurance systemhas taken on the role of
covering virtually all bank liability holders in the
event of an insolvency. If so, the insurance system
would be the only liability holder with an interest in
bank capital.
From a regulatory perspective, a bank with more
capital relative to assets will be less likely to fail,
and, ifit does fail, will impose smaller losses on the
insurance fund, all otherthings equal. However, the
probability of failure and the contingent liability of
the insurance system also depend on the variability
of the return on assets. 10 The higher the variability
ofthe return on assets for a given amount ofcapital,
the greater the chance of bank failure. 11
Consequently, acentral issue in capital regulation
is whether banks would respond to higher regula-
tory capital requirements by choosing riskier assets
to offset or even more than offset the effects of
higher capital on the exposure ofthe deposit insur-
ance system to bank risk. Below, we consider this
issue and examine under what conditions, if any,
regulation-induced increases in bank capital would
lower the expected losses of the deposit insurance
system.
II. Value Maximization
A value-maximizing bank chooses its portfolio
solely to maximize the current market value of
equity. Such a bank's portfolio decisions are inde-
pendent of the risk preferences of its individual
owners because the owners are fully able to adjust
the compositionoftheir personal portfolios to attain
any level ofrisk they desire. Therefore, even though
actual returns on the bank's portfolio are uncertain
(risky), a value-maximizing bank does not consider
the risk preferences of the owners.
Some ofthe implications ofbank capital regula-
tion for value-maximizing banks within the state-
preference framework are discussed in Dothan and
Williams (1980), Sharpe (1978), and Kareken and
Wallace (1978).12 All of these studies provide
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theoretical support for restricting leverage in bank-
ing when there is subsidized deposit insurance.
They do not, however, deal with the issue ofhow the
asset investment strategies of such insured banks
might be altered by capital regulation. Nor do they
consider how the behavior of a utility-maximizing
bank in the state-preference framework might differ
from that ofa value-maximizing bank.
This portion of the paper addresses the first of
these two issues by extending the examination of
bank capital regulation within a state-preference
framework. For the reader who is not familiar with
this framework, a brief description of the state-
preference model is presented in Box 1. Below, we
first show why leverage constraints are necessaryfor insured, value-maximizing banks. Then, we
assess the likely effects of changes in capital
requirements on the asset risk ofsuch banks and on
the liability of the deposit insurance system. The
discussion in SectionIII turns to the implications of
deposit insurance and capital regulation for utility-
maximizing banks within a state-preference model.
Value-Maximizing Banks
Although the state-preference modcl can be
applied to an individual investor's decisions, italso
can be used to analyze the portfolio and leverage
decisions of an insured bank that maximizes its
current value (the market value ofits equity). Since
the current value of such a bank is independent of
the risk preferences ofthe owners, we can put aside
any consideration of utility functions and focus
instead on how an insured bank's investment oppor-
tunity frontier itself is affected by leverage and
capital regulation.
The effects of leverage and the role of capital
regulation can be seen most easily through a numer-
ical example with two states and two securities. In
this example, security A represents a promise to pay
$4 if state 1 occurs and $6 if state 2 occurs, and is
summarized as A(4, 6). The second security,
security B, is summarized as B(1, 1). Security A is
a risky investment (a different payout in each state)
and security B is ariskless security (the same payout
in each state). Forexpositional purposes, we assume
that the current market price of a dollar payment in
state 1 is $.35 and the price of a dollar payment in
state 2 is $.60. The current price of a share of
security A then is $5. ($.35x4+$.6x6) and the
current price of security B IS $.95
($.35 xl + $.6 X 1).13
The bank is assumed to invest only in the risky
security. The bank's purchases of that security are
funded with a combination of capital and the pro-
ceeds from issuing shares of security B. Shares of
security B can be thought of as deposits that are
"insured" at a fixed-premium rate by the federal
government. In the example, the premium is set at
zero, but the analysis and conclusions would hold
even with a positive, fixed-rate premium. 14 Initial
capital is set at $500 by assumption. With no
deposits, the bank wouldhave 100 shares ofsecurity
A, and leverage would be one.
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The calculations in Table 1 demonstrate what
happens to the total net worth (current value) ofthe
bank's equity as leverage increases. In line 2, the
bank increases leverage to 2by issuingdeposits with
acurrentvalue of$500andpurchasing an additional
100 shares of security A. In both states I and 2 the
bank promises to repay depositors $526.32
($500/.95). The net claims (future wealth) of the
bank in each state after paying off deposits are
shown in column 6. The currentvalue ofthe bankto
the owners, column 8, is derived by multiplying the
net claims by the price of a dollar claim in the
appropriate state. The addition to the value of the
bank from the free deposit insurance, presented in
the last column, is derived by subtracting the initial
capital, $500, from the total value ofnet worth.
As Table 1 shows, initially the bank's value (net
worth) is not affected by issuing deposits. At the
lower levels of leverage, the bank would be indif-
ferent to the amount ofborrowing because its value
(column 8) would be unaffected. I5 Although the
risk ofthe bank increases with leverage, as reflected
in the growing disparity between the claims in the
two states (column 6), bankruptcy could not occur
and the deposit insurance fund would not be at risk
with leverage of 4 or less. Moreover, depositors
would be indifferent to the risk ofthe bank whether
or not their funds were insured as long as leverage
was less than or equal to 4.
Itis easy to see why the insurance fund as well as
depositors are not at risk at low levels of leverage.
Up to a point, the bank is able to meet its promised
payments to depositors in both states 1 and 2. The
bank would not fail in either state since its liabilities
would not exceed its assets. Therefore, while risk
increases with leverage, as long as the bank's capital
is sufficient to ensure payment, the added risk is
borne only by the bank. 16
As leverage continues to increase, the bank even-
tually will be unable to meet its promised obliga-
tions to depositors in the first state. Without a third
party guarantee such as deposit insurance, deposi-
tors would not be willing to lend to a bank in return
for apromise to pay only $1 (pershare) in each state.
With leverage equal to 5, for example, the bank
would issue a deposit with a current value of $.95
per share but would have to promise to pay about
$1.03 in each state instead of $1 (the actual pay-2425ments would be about $1 .03 in state 2and about.95
in state 1). The current value of the depositor's
claims would be unaffected because the higher
payment in state 2 would compensate for the lower
payment in state 1. The deposit guarantee, however,
would allow a bank with leverage greater than 4 to
continue promising $1 to depositors in both states
because the deposit insurance fund would cover the
shortfall in state 1.
As seen in column 8 ofTable I, once leverage is
extended to a point at which bank failure becomes
possible, the current net worth ofthe bank begins to
increase with leverage. The addition to net worth
represents the current value ofthe deposit insurance
guarantee (column 9). Abank gains from increasing
leverage and simultaneously investing additional
deposits in the risky security because the net claims
ofthe owners in state I can never be less than zero,
no matter how large the "promised" payments,
while the potential claims in state 2 are unlimited.
The state-preference model therefore predicts that a
value-maximizing bank with an insurance premium
less than the current value of the insurance payout
would limit its leverage only if forced to do so by
regulation.
26Capital Requirements and Risk
This brings us to the main questionfacing regula-
tors: will regulatory efforts to force banks to hold
more capital be partially or even totally offset by
banksthaUhenacquire riskier assets?
Toanswerthis question, anotherriskyassethasto
be introduced. In addition to security A(4, 6), we
assume that the bank also can hold the more risky
security, security D(O, 8.33), where the numbers in
Pllrentheses are the dollar claims per share of the
securities in the two possible states. The price of
security Dis $5 ($.35xO+$.6x8.33). A bank
with a given degree of leverage can alter its net
claims in future states by investing available funds
indifferent combinations of.these two risky assets.
Table 2 demonstrates how the value of a bank
with an initial leverage of3, initial capital of$500,
and underpriced deposit insurance is affected by
shifting from holding only security A to holding
greater proportions of its assets in security D.
Parallel to the case ofincreased leverage with asset
risk held constant (Table 1), a bank with a given
level of leverage benefits from increasing its asset
risk with underpriced deposit insurance only when
bankruptcy is possible (that is when deposit claims
exceed the bank's gross claims in state 1). Once
bankruptcy is possible, the value of the bank
increases withasset risk (thatis, with higherpropor-
tions ofsecurity D). Therefore, even ifleverage were
limited through regulation, a value-maximizing
27Leverage ~ 6
bank with deposit insurance would want to hold the
risky security that maximized the value of the
deposit guarantee. (In the example, this would be a
portfolio that includes only security D.)
Figure 1 shows how the gains from increasing
asset risk are affected by leverage. Each ofthe lines
in the figure tracks the current value of the deposit
guarantee to the bank that invests greater propor-
tions of funds in security D (and correspondingly
smaller proportions in security A), for a given
degree of leverage. The marginal value to a bank
from increasing asset risk (holding greater propor-
tions ofits asset in security D) is represented by the
slope of a line.
With low levels of leverage and asset risk, the
marginal value to increasing asset risk is zero (the
lines are horizontal). However, for higher levels of
leverage, the slopes ofthe lines increase as leverage
increases, indicating that the marginal value of
increasing asset risk increases with leverage. Put
another way, as the capital of an insured bank
increases, the marginal value to that bankofshifting
to a riskier composition of assets falls. This means
that more stringent capital requirements would not
give banks a greater incentive to invest in riskier
assets, and would reduce the liability ofthe deposit
insurance system. I?
With regulatory constraints on leverage, a bank
stilI would want to hold the risky asset, security D.
Figure 1
Effects of Leverage and Risk on the














o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Riskiness of Asset Portfolio
Percent of shares held in security 0
('100% minus the percent of shares held in security A)
2829As a result, regulators also might put controls on
asset risk to reduce the liability of the deposit
insurance system. For example, regulation might
limit a bank to holding less than 30 percent of its
assets insecurity D. However, ifregulatory limits on
the composition of bank assets and monitoring
(examinations) ofbanks were sufficientto constrain
the asset risk ofa bank for a given level ofleverage,
they would be sufficient for any lower level of
leverage because banks would have even less ofan
incentive to evade them. Consequently, as long as
regulators did not react to lower leverage (higher
capital) by relaxing theirefforts to limit asset risk, a
bank would not increase its asset risk, and the
liability of the insurance fund would decline. 18
Summary
Not surprisingly, capital regulation is necessary
with subsidized deposit insurance to limit the lia-
bility of the insurance fund. However, more strin-
gent capital standards for banks do not confound
regUlatory efforts to limit the riskiness of bank
assets because higher capital does not increase the
incentives of a value-maximizing bank to hold
riskier assets. In fact, the marginal value from
increasing asset risk for an insured bank declines as
leverage is lowered. This conclusion does not
depend solely on the state-preference framework.
As discussed in Box 2, a positive relation between
leverage and the gains from risk-taking also can be
derived from an options approach to evaluating the
gains from risk and leverage in banking.
III. Utility Maximization
In this section we incorporate utility maximiza-
tion into the state-preference model. With utility
maximization, the state-preference model implies
that capital regulation is either irrelevant because
risk-averse owner-managers will hold sufficiently
conservative portfolios to make bankruptcy impos-
sible or capital regulation will limit the liability of
the deposit insurance system in the same way that it
can for value-maximizing banks.
Utility-Maximizing Banks
Utility maximization has been rationalized as
being more applicable than value maximization to
smaller, owner-managed banks because the invest-
ment opportunity set for such banks and their
owners may be one and the same. The assumption
behind this rationalization is that the owner-man-
agercannot attractcapital in addition to his own and
that most of his portfolio is invested in the bank.
Consequently, unlike a bank that is maximizing its
current market value, the owner's preference toward
risk would influence the bank's portfolio deci-
sions. 19
It is assumed that the owner-managers are risk-
averse. As pointed out in Box I, in a simple two-
state world, risk aversion means that utility func-
tions are convex with respect to the origin. That is,
future wealth has diminishing marginal utility in
each state ofthe world. As is shown in the figure in
Box 1, in a world without deposit insurance, an
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investor will allocate his capital between the avail-
able securities to maximize utility along the invest-
ment opportunity frontier.
The introduction of underpriced deposit insur-
ance expands the opportunity frontier. The oppor-
tunity frontier with free deposit insurance can be
derived from the types of calculations presented in
Table 1. (Recall there is only one risky security
A(4,6), riskless borrowing by issuing security
B(l,l), free deposit insurance, and initial bank
capital of $500.) Figure 2 shows the various com-
binationsofwealth (WI andW2) thatcanbe attained
by increasing leverage and investing in the risky
security (security A). Point A in Figure 2 indicates
the combination attainable with no leverage, and the
shaded segment includes points attainable by
increasing leverage.
The key difference between the choice set with
deposit insurance and the set without deposit insur-
ance is that there is no limit to the amount ofwealth
that would be attained in state 2 once bankruptcy
would occur in state 1. That is, various wealth
outcomes (WI' W2), such as (0,895), (0,968),
(0,1042), can be attained only with free deposit
insurance. With free (or underpriced) deposit insur-
ance and no capital regulation, there is no limit to
the amountofwealth thatcould be attained in state 2
by increasing leverage.
Whether the effects of deposit insurance on the
opportunity set will influence the owner-manager'sFigure 2
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leverage decisions depends on the owner-manager's
preferences. To benefit from deposit insurance, the
owner-manager must be willing to risk bankruptcy
- that is, there must be some amount ofwealth in
state 2 that will compensate for zero wealth in state
1. If there were no such level of wealth in state 2,
utility functions would approach the axes
asymptotically and interior solutions (some wealth
in both states) would be obtained (thatis, a point on
the frontier to the left of point C). Without the
possibility of bankruptcy, the deposit insurance
fund would not be at risk, and no capital regulations
would be required. Moreover, even ifcapital regula-
tions were imposed, portfolios that make bank-
ruptcy possible would not be held.
Alternatively, ifthere were some level ofwealth in
state 2 that could compensate the bank owner for
zero wealth in state 1, the utility functions would
intersect the axis. Such a set of preferences is
depicted in Figure 2 as indifference curves Uland
U2 . In Figure 2, raising leverage would increase
utility (U2 > UI) because wealth in state 2 would
increase while wealth in state I would remain zero.
As shown in the previous section, this is the same
reason that the current value of the bank increases
with leverage. Consequently, maximizing the utility
offuture wealth in state 2 for the type ofpreferences
depicted in Figure 2(thatis, indifference curves that
intersect the axis) is equivalent to maximizing the
current value ofthe bank. Like a value-maximizing
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bank, a utility-maximizing bank that is willing to
accept bankruptcy will maximize leverage.
Capital Requirements and Risk
The predictions of the.state-preference model
regarding the effect of capital regulations on asset
risk for utility-maximizing banks (that will accept
bankruptcy) also are similar to those for value-
maximizing banks. As just stated, maximizing util-
ity is equivalent to maximizingwealth in state 2 (the
nonbankruptcy state) for a bank that has under-
priced deposit insurance and will accept a nonzero
risk of bankruptcy. Table 2 shows that if leverage
were restricted by regulation to 3, wealth in state 2
could be increased by increasing asset risk (holding
a larger proportion of assets in security D). There-
fore, it could be necessary to regulate even utility-
maximizing banks' asset portfolios to prevent such
banks from increasing asset risk.20
Table 2 also indicates that wealth in state 2 is
directly proportional to the currentvalue ofthe bank
when bankruptcy is possible in state 1. (With bank-
ruptcy possible in state I, wealth in state 2 is equal
to the current value ofthe bank divided by .6.) This
means that the marginal effect on wealth in state 2
for a given increase in asset risk declines as leverage
declines, just as does the marginal effect on the
currentvalue ofthe bank (see Figure 1).21 Therefore,
as long as the regulatory efforts to prevent a bank
from increasing asset risk are not lessened, impos-
ing a lowerleverage position would not increase the
incentives for a utility-maximizing bank to increase
asset risk.
Summary
In sum, incorporating utility maximization into
the state-preference model does not affect our con-
clusion that more stringent leverage requirements
will reduce payouts from the deposit insurance fund
as long as the stringency of portfolio regulation
remains unchanged. Some owner-managers might
be so risk-averse thatthey wouldbe unwillingtorisk
bankruptcy even with deposit insurance. However,
the owner-manager that will risk bankruptcy in one
state for a sufficiently high claim in the other state
would seek to maximize wealth in the non-bank-
ruptcy state. For such persons, utility maximization
and value maximization are comparable and all of
the results ofthe earlier section apply.IV. Summary and Conclusions
This paper analyzes the theoretical relationships
among' capital regulation, bank asset risk, and the
liability ofthe federal depositinsurance system. We
demonstrated that a bank can benefit from under-
priceddepositinsuranceby increasing leverage and/
or asset risk. As a result, some degree of capital
regulation is needed to limit the liability of the
deposit insurance fund.
More importantly, the analysis suggests that reg-
ulatory increases in capital standards will not
require greater efforts to restrain asset risk. On the
contrary, the marginal value ofincreasing asset risk
declines as leverage falls - that is, less leverage
(more capital) reduces the gain from risk-taking. In
other words,.banks with the least capital have the
most incentive to increase asset risk.
We have shown under the assumption of value
maximization that more stringent capital regulation
lowers the contingent liability of the deposit insur-
ance system as long as the stringency of asset
portfolio restraints is not reduced. This result fol-
lows for value-maximizing banks in both the state-
preference and options models. Moreover, incor-
porating utility maximization into the state-prefer-
ence model does not change this conclusion.
The key policy implication that stems from our
analysis is that regulatory efforts to raise capital
standards in banking would not by themselves lead
to more risky asset portfolios.
FOOTNOTES
ilProb [Failure] -f ( )[l - A + rl - E(pA)) > 0 (1)
SO' (J'2 '
SProb [Failure] = f ( ) (1 + r) > 0 (2)
ill 0'2
10. From an economic standpoint, a bank (or any other
firm) fails when the value of its capital falls below zero.
Mathematically, the probability of failure is the probability
that the value of end-of-period assets is less than that of
end-of-period liabilities:
Prob[Failure] = Prob [(1 + p)A< (1 + r)lJ, (1)
promised rate on liabilities,
l = initial value of liabilities, and
Prob [ ] = denotes the probability of [ ].
Without information on the type of probability distribution
governing pA, the probabilityoffailure can be bounded by
using the Tchebichef inequality (see Koehn and San- '
tomero, 1980). However, by assuming that the normal
distribution approximates the distribution of pA (i.e.,
PA - N[E(pA), O'2(pA))), wecan solveforthe probabilityof
failure:
Prob [Failure] = F[l - A +_rl - E(pA)] (2)
O'(pA)
where: F = the standard (J-L = 0, (J'2 = 1) unit normal
cumulative distribution function.
11. Equation 2 in footnote 10 indicates that the probability
of failure increases as the riskiness of the asset portfolio,
O'(pA), increases, and as leverage (as reflected in the
quantity ofliabilities relative to assets) increases. To prove
this, the equation can be differentiated with respect to the
applicable parameter as follows:
1. Actions taken in 1981, 1983 and 1985 raised capital
requirements for banks and bank holding companies, and
made the federal bank regulatory agencies' definitions of
capital more uniform.
2. The proposal for risk-based capital standards was
made public in January 1987.
3. The measure of common equity used in these ratios is
not the current regulatory definition of equity capital that
includes loan loss reserves and preferred stock.
4. See, "Fed Urgues Swap Plan for Banks," New York
Times, March 5, 1987.
5. Otherstudies that considerthe effects ofcapital regula-
tion on bankasset riskwithin the mean-varianceframework
are Kahane (1977), Blair and Heggestad (1978), and
Hanweck (1984).
6. Koehn and Santomero (1980), p. 1244.
7. For purposes of this paper, failure and bankruptcy
occurwhen the marketvalue of a bank's liabilities exceeds
that of its assets.
8. We recognize that the utility maximization model also
might be rationalized by appealing to the notion of the
separation of ownership and control so that the firm's
operating decisions depend on the manager's risk prefer-
ences.
9. Some articles appear to confuse financial capital with
physical capital. For example, Santomero and Watson
(1977) view financial capital as a physical investment that
could have been made in other sectors of the economy.
Financial capital, however, is not directly related to physi-
cal investment, and higher bank capital does not limit the
amount of physical investment in other sectors of the
economy. The amount of capital relative to liabilities is
simply a reflection of the way a bank finances its assets.
Bank capital as well as liabilities are available to be invest-
ed in nonbankphysical investmentthrough bankloans, for
example, as well as in bank facilities.
32
where: rate of return on assets (which is
assumed to be random),
A = initial assets,where f( ) is the standard normal density function evalu-
ated at the initial position. The first inequality holds
because the term in brackets is negative. Also note, in the
second inequality, assets are held constant and, thus, an
increase in liabilities reflects a corresponding decrease in
capital.
12. Other studies such as Merton (1977) and Pyle (1984)
provipElLJseful insights into the regulation of bankleverage
and ass~trisk byusing optionsmodelsto analyzethe value
of the federal deposit guarantee. In Box 2, we analyze the
effects ofcapital standards on asset risk in banking using
an options model.
13.. This implies a risk-free real interest rate of 5.26 per-
cent, (($1.001$.95)-1] x 100%.
14. The analysis would be essentially the same if the
premium rates were variable as long asthe premiums paid
were less than the value of the deposit guarantee.
15. The indifferenceof a lowleverage bankin ourexample
to thedegreeofleverageparallelsProposition I(the market
value of a firm is independent of its capital structure) in
Modigliani and Miller (1958). While Modigliani and Miller
do not use a state-preference model, Hirshleifer (1966)
uses the state-preference approach to show that Proposi-
tion I still holds in that framework. In fact, the state-prefer-
ence model can be used to showthat the Modigliani-Miller
theorem holdswith orwithout bankruptcy, when there is no
subsidized deposit insurance.
16. One policy implication here is that the distortions of
deposit insurance could be eliminated if risk in banking
were borne only by the banks. Along this line, it has been
suggested that risk would not be shifted to the insurance
fund ifthere weretimely closures of banks. With continuous
(and costless) monitoring of banks, this would correspond
to closing a bank before its market net worth reached zero
(Furlong and Keeley, 1985). With periodic examinations of
banks, the state-preference approach indicates that
losses to the insurancefund could beavoidedonly if banks
had enough capital to ensure their solvency in all possible
states.
17. In this two-state model, the probability of failure actu-
ally would decline only if leverageand risk were restricted
in such a way thatthe bank could meet obligations in each
state. In a model with more than two states, the probability
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oHailure would decline with decreased leverage as the
number of states in which the bank was able to meet
promised payments increased.
18. In this paper, we have not dealt directly with bank-
ruptcy costs. As shown in Dothan and Wil.liams (1980),
such costs can lead to a determinate degree of leverage
for a value-maximizing uninsured bank. However, bank-
ruptcy costs are not sufficient to limit leverage if banks
have access to a subsidized deposit insurance. Although
bankruptcy costs are not incurred in all future states, they
nonetheless can be evaluated in terms of their effects on
the current value in the state-preference framework. It can
be shown that, with free deposit insurance, bankruptcy
costs that are fixed or proportional to assets generally will
be insufficient to limit leverage. This result holds whether
bankruptcy costs fall on the bank or on the depositors.
19. Despite legitimate questions as to whether this
assumption would apply to any real-world banks since
owners of small, privately held banks can diversify their
portfolios, we hold to it.
20. It is possible that, with leverage held sufficiently low,
the wealth attainable in state 2 from investing in the riskier
security would not be adequate to compensate a utility
maximizing bank owner for risking zero wealth in state 1,
even if the utility curves crossed the axis. In such a case,
the bank would choose a portfolio along the AC portion of
the opportunity frontier in Chart 2, and no other portfolio
restraints would be required. However, at some higher
level of leverage the same bank would begin to take
advantage of the opportunity to increase wealth in state 2
through investing in the riskier asset, security D.
Similar results hold in a model with more than two states.
With very low leverage, a bank may not be able to realize
sufficient compensation in the nonbankruptcy states to
justify risking bankruptcy in even one possible future state.
It would not be necessary to regulate the composition of
such a bank's assets. At higher levelsof leverage, the bank
ultimately would increase asset risk and allow for bank-
ruptcy in at least some states.
21. In a multi-state world it also is the case that the
marginal effect on wealth in each of the nonbankruptcy
states with positive payouts would increase with leverage.ApPENDIX
Capital Regulation and Asset Risk
in a Utility-Maximization, Mean-Variance Framework
Introduction
A number of studies have attempted to analyze
the effects of bank capital regulation on asset risk
and the probability of bankruptcy while assuming
that banks maximize utility in a mean-variance
framework. This literature is besttypified by articles
by Kahane (1977), and Koehn and Santomero
(1980).
We show below that the conclusions reached by
these studies were derived using internally inconsis-
tent assumptions. Both studies assume that a bank's
borrowing cost would be unrelated to bank risk.
That is, a bank's borrowing cost (per dollar of
liabilities) is assumed to be constant regardless ofits
asset risk orleverage. Thus, these studies implicitly,
but unintentionally, assume that bank failure cannot
occur. Yet, they seekto analyze the effects ofcapital
regulation on the probability ofbank failure. More-
over, these studies fail to take into account the effect
ofunderpriced deposit insurance on the incentive to
take on excessive risk.
A possible explanation for why these studies
overlook the effects of bankruptcy on the bank's
borrowing cost is that the basic mean-variance
framework used is adapted from the finance litera-
ture on investment, which does not allow for bank-
ruptcy since borrowing and lending are assumed to
take place at the risk-free interest rate. While this
simplifying assumption may be appropriate for cer-
tain investment decisions, it is not appropriate for
the analysis of banking with underpriced deposit
insurance. The reason is that concern over the
exposure ofthe deposit insurance system to risk in
banking arises only when bankruptcy is possible.
In this Appendix, we first constructaprototype of
the utility-maximization, mean-variance model
used in past studies to analyze the effects of bank
capital regulation on asset risk. We show that when
bankruptcy is not possible, and, thus, when there is
no deposit insurance subsidy, the results from our
prototypical model are identical to those of the
previous studies. Specifically, the effect on asset
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risk of moving from one binding capital constraint
to a more stringent one depends on the nature ofthe
preferences ofthe bank's owner-manager. Restrict-
ing such an analysis to situations where bankruptcy
is not possible, however, makes these conclusions
irrelevant for policy purposes since capital regula-
tion is needed only when bank failures and deposit
insurance payouts are possible.
In the next section of the Appendix, we add the
possibility of bankruptcy and subsidized deposit
insurance to the model. Doing so changes markedly
the bank's investment opportunity set. In addition,
we presenta specific numerical exampleto illustrate
that, when the asset return distribution is binomial,
the incentive to increase asset risk does not increase
as the stringency of capital regulation increases
regardless of the nature of the bank owner-man-
ager's preferences.
Background
The utility-maximization framework assumes
that the bank owner-manager's preferences toward
risk can be characterized by the expected rate of
return on capital, E(z), and the standarddeviation of
the rate of return (f(z). Moreover, assuming risk-
aversion, these preferences can be depicted by a set
of concave, upward sloping iso-utility functions
depicting the tradeoffbetween the expected rate-of-
return and risk.
Such iso-utility functions, Uland U2 (Ui =
U[E(z), (f(Z)]), are depicted in Figure AI. The
vertical axis represents the expected rate of return
and the horizontal axis represents risk as measured
by the standarddeviation ofthe rate ofreturn. Along
indifference curve Ul' the investor is indifferent
among the various combinations ofexpected returJ;l
and risk. However, the investor prefers the points on
U2 to those on U1because, for any given level ofrisk
(standard deviation) the expected rate of return on
U2 is larger.
The ideas behind this characterization of prefer-
ences are that initial wealth is given and that theinvestor is concerned about the expected value of
future wealth along with its standard deviation.
Future wealth is equal to one plus the rate ofreturn
times current wealth. Consequently, with current
wealth (capital) assumed fixed, the mean and vari-
ance offuture wealth are mathematically equivalent
to the mean and variance of the rate of return on
capital, respectively. Thus, similar to the state-
preference model, utility maximization in a mean-
variance framework also focuses on the probability
distribution of future wealth.
Utility-Maximization Without Bankruptcy
A bank must decide on how risky an asset port-
folio to hold and by how much to leverage that
portfolio. Given the owner's preferences toward
risk, utility will be maximized subject to a con-
straint that relates the expected return on capital,
E(z), to the standard deviation of the rate of return
(T(z). To derive this constraint, note that ifthe bank
chooses sufficiently low leverage and asset risks to
make bankruptcyimpossible (that is, promisedobli-
gations to depositors are always met regardless of
the asset return that is realized, the rate ofreturn on
capital, Z, is given by the gross returns on assets,
Ap, minus promised (which equals the actual) pay-
mentsto liability holders, Lr, divided by initial
The expected rate ofreturn on capital, E(z) may be
found by taking expected values ofboth sides of








rate of return on assets, assumed to be
random
rate ofreturn on capital, which is random
promised (which equals actual) rate of
return paid on (and cost of) liabilities.
z= [AlK] [p-r] +r.
E(z) = [A/K] [E(P) - r] +r,
(As discussed morefully later, ifbankruptcywere
possible, the cost of liabilities would no longer be
fixed since actual payments to depositors would
sometimes be less than promised payments. This
impliesthatthe costofdeposits to the bankwouldbe
a random variable, which depends on the rate of
return on assets realized and leverage chosen. Con-
sequently, equation Al would not apply to realiza-
tions ofpwhen bankruptcy occurred.)
Equation AI may be rewritten by noting that








as long as r is fixed and not random, which it would
be as long as bankruptcy were not possible.AI Thus,
increasing leverage, as measured by the asset-to-
capital ratio increases the owner's expected rate of
return on capital linearly as long as default is not
possible.A2 (We latershowthis result changes when
bankruptcy is possible).
Similarly, the standard deviation ofthe return on
capital, (T(z), may be derived from equation A2 by
noting that when bankruptcy is not possible, the
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35(This equation is not valid when bankruptcy is
possible since the covariance of p and the cost of
deposits is not zero.)
Equations A3 and A4 may be jointly solved to
eliminate the [A/K] term to give
utilityfunction with the risk-return frontier for capi-
tal (the straight line in Figure AI). However, the
assumption here is that the unconstrained bank
would choose a degree ofleverage for which bank-
ruptcy is not possible.
In other words, expected return on capital varies
linearly with the standard deviation of return on
capital for a given expected asset return and stan-
dard deviation ofthe return.
This linearrelationship, equation A5, is plotted as
the straight line intersecting the vertical axis at r in
Figure AI. It is assumed that the particular asset
portfolio with expected return E(po) and standard
deviationa(po) is being leveraged. With no leverage
(A = K), the expected rate of return and standard
deviation of return on capital are equal to the
expected rate of return and standard deviation of
return on that particular asset portfolio- E(po) and
a(po), respectively. As leverage increases, the
expected rate of return and standard deviation of
return both increase linearly.
In general, it is assumed that a bank faces a
variety ofdifferent asset risk-return combinations as
determined by the availabilityofinvestmentalterna-
tives in its market (known as the asset risk-return
frontier). As shown in Figure AI, asset portfolios
with more risk are assumed to yield larger expected
returns. Also, it is assumed that the banking sector
is small enough that the asset risk-return frontier is
unaffected by banks' behavior. Thus, that frontier is
taken as given by banks in their optimizing deci-
sions.
In this framework, the most efficient asset port-
folio is the one where a line from the constant
borrowing rate, r, is tangent to the asset risk-return
frontier. This is depicted as point E(po), a(po) in
Figure AI. By leveraging this asset portfolio, the
bank can obtain the highest expected return on its
capital for any degree of risk. Since this tangency
point does not depend on the bank owner's prefer-
ences, the asset portfolio (that is, the particular
combination ofassets) chosen depends only on the
risk-free interest rate and the asset risk-return fron-
tier. The degree of leverage chosen, however, is
determined by the tangency of the owner's iso-
E(z) [a(z) /a(p)][E(p) - r] + r. (A5)
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Capital Requirements and Risk
In Figure AI, we showed how a particular asset
portfolio may be leveraged (assuming no bank-
ruptcy) to obtain the capital risk-return frontier. Of
course, any asset portfolio may be leveraged
although there would be no reason for a bank owner
to leverage any asset portfolio other than the most
efficient one in a world without capital or asset
portfolio regulation. When capital constraints are
imposed, however, the bankownergenerally will be
able to increase utility by leveraging asset portfolios
other than the one characterized by the parameters
E(po), a(po)· For example, suppose that the max-
imum asset-to-capital ratio allowed were 5. Then
the standard deviation ofreturn on capital would be
5 times the standard deviation ofreturn on the asset
portfolio chosen, and the expected return on capital
also would be five times greater.
Figure A2
Imposing a Binding Capital Constraint





the Rate of ReturnFigure A3
Increasing the Stringency of Capital Regulation
In geometric terms, the risk and return on capital
for agiven asset portfolio and leverage can be found
by extending a ray from the constant borrowing rate
through the asset portfolio chosen up to the max-
imum leverage allowed. As Figure A2 shows, when
leverage is limited by regulation, the capital-risk
return frontier becomes convex once the leverage
constraintbecomes binding. As aresult, ifabinding
capital constraint were imposed on a previously
unconstrained bank, the bank would choose a more
risky asset portfolio. This is shown as a move from
Voto V 1 in Figure A2.
In Figure A3, two binding capital constraints, CI
and C2, and a particular set of preferences are
depicted. However, as one moves from one binding
capital constraint, CI, to a more stringent one, C2,
the effects on asset risk depend on the owner's risk
preferences asset risk can either increase,
decrease, or remain the same, which is the basic
conclusion reached by the traditional literature.
The expected rate ofreturn on capital, E(z), found
by taking the expected value ofequation A6 is:
ifbankruptcy does
occur, that is, if
A(l +p)< L(l +r).
-1
z=
E(z) = -I Prob[Failure] (A7)
+ E[(Ap-rL)/KIp>p*](l-Prob[Failure])
bankruptcy could not occur. Such a bank could
attract deposits at the risk-free rate because it would
always make the payments promised regardless of
the return on assets realized. Consequently, the cost
ofdeposits to suchabankwould be fixed atthe risk-
free rate r, and not be a random variable.
With free deposit insurance, a bank could issue
deposits at a fixed risk-free promised rate even if
bankruptcy were possible. However, the cost of
deposits to the bank would no longer necessarily
equal the risk-free rate. When bankruptcy occurs,
the bank effectively would pay less than the prom-
ised rate on deposits, r. Only when bankruptcy does
not occurdoes the costofdeposits to the bankequal
the risk-free rate. Put another way, the excess of
contractual debt obligations over assets when bank-
ruptcy occurs corresponds to the option value of
deposit insurance (see Box 2). Thus, the effective
deposit costto the bank is a random variable related
to the rate ofreturn on assets and leverage.
As a result, the expected cost of deposits to the
bank would decline with increasing leverage and
would be less than the risk-free rate. This means that
neither the expected rate-of-return equation, A3,
nor the standard-deviation of the rate-of-return
equation, A4, would hold. Instead, the rate ofreturn
on capital, Z, to abank withfree deposit insurance is
given by:
[Ap - Lr]/K ifbankruptcy does (A6)












The analysis above was derived under the
assumption that an unconstrained bank would
always make asset and leverage choices such that
where
*_ K(l+r)+ p ----- r
A
(A8)
37is the level of p above which bankruptcy does not
occur and
Equations A6 andA7 indicate that the simple linear
relationship between E(z) and a(z) presented in
equation A5, generally would not be valid.A3
Moreover, Equation A7 indicates that the bank
owner would never lose more than his or her initial
capital (that is, the minimum z would be - I, even
though z would be less than minus 1ifthe promised
obligation to depositors were met in the event of a
bankruptcy). Also, equation A9 indicates that,
Prob[p<




depending on the asset rate-of-return distribution,
the probabilityoffailure can increase up to apoint as
leverage increases. However, in the limit as leverage
increases (and KIA goes to zero), the probability of
failure approaches the probability that the rate of
return on assets, p, is less than the promised rate on
deposits, r.
Consequently, by increasing leverage, the owner
can increase without limitthe expectedrate ofreturn
on capital as long as at least some part of the asset
rate-of-return distribution exceeds the promised
deposit rate. Thus, even ifthe expectedrate ofreturn
on assets were less than the promised rate on
deposits, abank with underpriced deposit insurance
would gain from leverage as long as this condition
held. This conclusion contrasts with the results
obtained when bankruptcy is not possible. In that
38case, leverage can increase expected return only if
the expected return on assets exceeds the promised
rate.
A Numerical Example
Below, a simple numerical example is presented
that allows for both subsidized deposit insurance
and the possibility of bankruptcy. This example
shows that a bank can gain from subsidized deposit
insurance only by assuming a nonzero risk ofbank-
ruptcy. The example also shows that when asset
returns are distributed binomially, more stringent
capital regulation will not increase the incentive to
increaseassetrisk. Thus, this example demonstrates
that the results in the cited mean-variance literature
do not hold generally.
The calculations presented in Table Al demon-
strate what happens to the expected return and
standard deviation of return on an initial $100
investment ofcapital in a bank (with deposit insur-
ance provided to it at no cost by the government) as
leverage increases. To simplifY the calculations, we
assume that the rate of return on the asset being
leveraged is drawn from a binomial probability
distribution with a .5 probabilityofa 10 percent rate
ofreturn and a .5 probabilityofa0 rate ofreturn (for
an expectedrate ofreturn of5percent). It is assumed
that the bank is able to attract any quantity of
deposits it wants at a promised 4 percent rate of
return because deposit insurance (which is provided
free to the bank) covers any shortfalls when bank-
ruptcy occurs.
The calculations in the Table demonstrate what
happens to expected end-of-period capital and its
standard deviation as leverage increases. (The rate
ofreturn on capital, in percentage terms, is justend-
of-period capital minus 100). In line 2, the bank
increases leverage to 2 by issuing $100 of deposits
and promising to return $104 to depositors at the
end ofthe period. The end-of-period capital for each
of the two possible asset returns after paying the
deposit claims is shown in column 6. The expected
end-of-period capital and standard deviation ofend-
of-period capital are shown in columns 8 and 9. The
payment from the deposit insurance fund is shown
in column 7.
As the Table indicates, initially, as leverage
increases up to 26, the expected return and standard
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deviation ofreturnboth increaselinearlyand there is
no bankruptcy. After this point (when leverage
exceeds26), there is a50percentchanceofrealizing
the low asset return (denoted as outcome 2) and
going bankrupt. However, there is also a 50 percent
chanceofdrawing thehigh assetreturn andprofiting
from leverage. As leverage increases, end-of-period
capital increases without limitas long as bankruptcy
does not occur.A4
Rationality implies that a person will prefer a
lottery that pays $100 with a 50 percent chance and
$0 with a 50 percent chance to one that pays $10
with a 50 percent chance and $0 with a 50 percent
chance.AS Thus, this example illustrates that even a
risk averse bank owner that is willing to risk bank-
ruptcy (that is, one who is willing to participate in
the type of lottery just described) in return for a
sufficiently high payoffwhen the higherasset return
is realized would prefer unlimited leverage. Conse-
quently, in this example, maximizing utility is
equivalent to maximizing value as long as the bank
owner is willing to risk bankruptcy.
In this simple model, a similarresult would apply
to asset risk under leverage constraints. As long as
some non-zero probability of bankruptcy were
acceptable, a bankownerwould maximize asset risk
since that would maximize end-of-period capital if
bankruptcy did not occurand would not affect end-
of-period capital if bankruptcy did occur. These
implications are in sharp contrast to those from the
cited mean-variance literature which claims that
risk aversion would limit leverage and a~set risk.
Moreover, as in the state preference model pre-
sented in this paper, it can be shown that the gain
from increasing asset risk is positively related to
leverage. Thus, in the case ofbinomially distributed
asset returns, more stringent capital regulation does
not increase the incentive to increase asset risk.
Summary
The results of previous studies using the mean-
variance framework regarding the effect of capital
regulation on asset risk can be replicated assuming
that bankruptcy is not possible. However, when
bankruptcy is possible and underpriced deposit
insurance is provided to banks, the results of these
studies no longer hold generally.APPENDIX ENDNOTES
A1. An uninsured bank could attract deposits by paying a
fixed rate of interest, independent of its leverage or asset
risk as long as its asset risk were low enough relative to
capital that the probability of bankruptcy were zero. As
long as.bankruptcy were not possible, bank liability
holders would not be at risk of loss due to default and
would accept bank liabilities as riskless. At some point,
however, as leverage increased (for a given nonzero asset
risk), bankruptcy would become possible and the bank
would have to pay a higher deposit rate to compensate
depositors for the risk of default.
The utility-maximization literature cited assumes a con-
stant borrowing rate environment,'but does not explicitly
acknowledge that this would be consistent only with azero
probability of bankruptcy. Kahane does allow for a
stochastic deposit rate but assumes the promised rate
equals the rate the bank expects to pay. Moreover, he
assumes the expected cost of deposits and the promised
rate are independent of leverage and asset risk. These
assumptions would hold only if bankruptcywere not possi-
ble.
A2. Thus, it is crucial to distinguish the asset from the
capital risk-return frontier. Blair and Heggestad (1978) fail
to do so.
A3. However, we do not mean to imply that equations A6
and A7 necessarily can be used to derive the appropriate
risk-return constraint for utility maximization in a mean-
variance framework. One reason is that variance no longer
adequately characterizes risk when bankruptcy is possi-
ble.
A4. After the point where bankruptcy becomes possible,
the relationship between the expected rate of return on
capital (column 8 minus 100) and its standard deviation
changes (the expected rate of return rises more rapidly
and the standard deviation rises less rapidly with lever-
age.)
A5. This is true even though the standard deviation of the
first alternative is larger.
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